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Summary 
Internet, mp3 files, peer-to-peer software and digital technologies for copying have 
radically modified the music sector. In this paper I present a theoretical model, that 
investigates the consequences of the appearance of a pirate low quality good (typically a 
mp3 file) in the music market. In this paper I propose a model of sampling, consider the 
possibility that the firm modifies its business entering into the low quality segment and 
investigate the supposed conflict between the recording company, whose profit depends 
on the CD sold, and the artist, whose profits depend in part on the live performance, the 
demand of which can increase for the positive externality due to the illegal download of 
music. 
 
Keywords: File-sharing, Copyright, Sample Effect, Mp3, Concert 
JEL Classification: L86, 084 
 
A previous version of this paper has been presented at the 12th Spring Meeting of 
Young Economists (SMYE) in Hamburg, May 2007 and will be presented at the 34rd 
Meeting of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) in 
















Address for correspondence: 
 
Iacopo Grassi  
Dipartimento di Economia  
Università Federico II  
Via Cinthia, Monte Sant Angelo  
80126 Napoli  
Italy 
E-mail: iagrassi@unina.it The music market in the age of Download¤
Iacopo Grassiy
Abstract
Internet, mp3 ¯les, peer-to-peer software and digital technologies for
copying have radically modi¯ed the music sector. In this paper I present
a theoretical model, that investigates the consequences of the appearance
of a pirate low quality good (typically a mp3 ¯le) in the music market.
In this paper I propose o model of sampling, consider the possibility that
the ¯rm modi¯es its business entering into the low quality segment and
investigate the supposed con°ict between the recording company, whose
pro¯t depends on the CD sold, and the artist, whose pro¯ts depends in
part on the live performance, which demand can increase for the positive
externality due to the illegal download of music.
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1 Introduction
The ¯rst years of this century have been characterized by the ¯nal success of
Internet and digital technology as main way to exchange and preserve any kind
of knowledge. If, on the one hand, the growing simplicity in communications has
allowed an unpredictable development in many sectors of the modern society,
on the other hand, new forms of technological piracy and copyright violation
appeared, in particular from end-users.
In this context the phenomenon most capturing media attention in the last
years is the sharing of music ¯les on the Internet. In 1999 the term ¯le sharing
itself was unknown to most people; in 2001 Michael Greene, then president
of the National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences, declared \The most
insidious virus in our midst is the illegal downloading of music on the Net"1. In
the meantime Napster had appeared to shock the recording industry.
¤I received useful comments from Gabriella Aubry, Claudia Cantabene, Umberto Iolli,
Riccardo Martina, Giacomo Valletta, and Marco Venuti. All remaining errors are mine.
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1Cited in Clement (2003).
1Napster was a software that allowed people to share on the net their music
folder, without the ¯lter of a central computer. Napster appeared at the right
time: the digitization of music was complete, after the cd had completely re-
placed LPs and tapes, most households had a computer in developed countries,
and most of these computers were connected to the Internet. Although most of
the recording companies immediately understood the danger deriving from ¯le
sharing software, two years were needed to stop the service: Napster went live
on June 1st, 1999; on December 7th 1999 the Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA) sued Napster for copyright infringement; on July 11th 2001
Napster was permanently shut down. During these two years ¯le sharing be-
came a massive activity and far more e±cient software was being programmed,
the music business completely changed.
According to the recording industry the unprecedented decrease in music
sales, which started in the year 2001, following more than a decade of constant
growth in the market size2, is due to the di®usion in the use of peer-to-peer
software for the sharing of compressed music ¯les, mp3 in particular : such ¯le
is a digital encoding format developed in 1991, it allows a great reduction of
the amount of data required to represent audio, with a reasonable loss of sound
quality.
The aim of this paper is to provide some useful insights to the analysis of
any market where a copyrighted good which can be pirated is produced, in
particular I analyze the music market, since in such a market end-user piracy
has been massive.
The ¯rst result I obtain after the analysis of sampling, is the de¯nition of
criteria and conditions that evidence when free download can have a positive
e®ect on the pro¯ts of the recording companies, and how such a situation is
highly improbable in the case of the music sector.
Surprisingly the increasing economic theoretical literature that in last years
has analyzed the ¯le-sharing and piracy problem, has ignored how the strat-
egy and the pro¯t of the ¯rms can change, if the monopolist itself enters the
low quality market. The second part of this paper ¯lls this gap, investigating
whether the ¯rm can react the piracy entering in the new market, and when this
strategy can increase the ¯rm pro¯ts compared both with a no-copying world
and the case it decides not to enter the new market.
Moreover music market presents an interesting distinction on the supply side
between the recording company, that produces the music, and the artist, who
writes it. The ¯nal result of this paper is to note, in contrast with part of
the literature, that ¯le sharing can undermine the contrast between recording
companies and artists.
1.1 Related literature
Piracy and copyright violation is not a recent phenomenon: since the inven-
tion of the photocopier, the di®usion of technologies of mechanical reproduction
2Data on the sales of American music market are available from the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA).
2paved the way to a growing number of copies of goods. For example publish-
ing and record industries were ¯rst pirated by the photocopier and the tape
recorder. The economic literature on information reproductions from journals,
books, and music recoding (Liebowitz 1985, Besen and Kirby 1989, Varian 2000)
shows that publishers may earn higher pro¯ts when copies are allowed, under
the assumption that they can price discriminate between users. Moreover pho-
tocopies or recorded tapes are not perfect reproductions of the original, but
lower quality substitutes.
The record industry has not been the only industry to su®er piracy due to
digitization: another industry to su®er a massive piracy of its products is the
software industry. In this sector the consequence of piracy is not necessarily neg-
ative to the ¯rm: some economic literature (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Takeyama
1994, Shy and Thiesse 1999) has been arguing that piracy can create a positive
externality e®ect. If the value of a software is increasing with the number of
users, software piracy may exert a positive e®ect on pro¯ts. Firm's earnings
need not be reduced as a result of piracy as long as the demand for legal copies
is enhanced by the distribution of illegal copies.
Some literature on piracy (Shy and Thiesse 1999, Banerjee 2003, 2006) con-
sider the case where a pirate ¯rm enters the market. The main problems with
¯le sharing is that end-user piracy \changes the rules", since in this case the
objective of the pirate is not to maximize his own pro¯ts, but simply to share
the ¯le.
Hence in the last years a growing theoretical literature has examined end
user copying and download, trying an analysis of ¯le-sharing, and the general
result is that the possibility to copy leads to lower ¯rms pro¯ts, but that under
some circumstances the downloading could increase ¯rms pro¯ts, or at least
not necessary conduct to the bankruptcy of the recording industry. Recent
contributions centrad on ¯le sharing and peer to peer are Gayer and Shy (2003,
2005).
Gopal et al. (2005) and Peitz and Waelbroeck (2005) show that, under some
circumstances, pirated ¯rms can increase their revenue in the presence of free
download. In particular Peitz and Waelbroeck (2005) examine the role of sam-
pling in the music sector: having the chance to listen to new artists downloading
their songs from the net, the consumers can decide to purchase cds and albums
that they would otherwise have never known. Such a circumstance might have
a positive e®ect on the pro¯ts of the record ¯rms.
Finally Gayer and Shy (2006) introduce the con°ict between publisher and
artist in the literature. According to their paper ¯le sharing enlarges the con°ict
between artists and publishers, in account of the di®erence in the source of their
pro¯ts: principally cd sales for the ¯rst, revenue from concerts for the latter.
My contribution adds to this literature: starting from the description of the
Italian markets of music and Home Video, I built a model able to explain the
consequences of the appearance of a pirate low quality good in the music market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the
Italian markets of Music and Home Video; section 3 sets up the basic model;
section 4 extends the model to an intertemporal framework with two periods;
3section 5 includes in the analysis the case of a ¯rm deciding to enter itself in
the low quality good market; section 6 modi¯es the basic model introducing the
distinction between artist and recording company; section 7 concludes.
2 The Italian Markets of Music and Home Video
The data on the sales of the Italian music market are available on a yearly
basis from Federazione Industrie Musicali Italiane (FIMI), the organization that
represents ¯rms operating in the industry. The public data set of the FIMI
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Figure 1: Italian Music Market (Thousands of Copies). Source FIMI
During the 90s the Italian music market constantly grew in size. On the
contrary an analysis of the sales in the same sector from 1998 to 2005 shows a
dramatic decrease in the number of musical support sold, decreasing from an
historical maximum of almost 54 millions of units in 1999, to little more than
29 millions in 2005. (See Table 1)
Comparing this data with the number of Internet users3 (passed in the same
period in Italy from 3,7 millions in 1998 to 31,3 millions in 2006) and with the
penetration of the broad band (still not existent in 1998, over 8 millions of lines
in 2006), it is possible to understand the reason why the recording industries
are greatly worried about the di®usion in the use of peer-to-peer software for
¯le sharing.
3O±cial data on Internet users and Internet penetration in Italy are achievable from Au-
toritµ a per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (AGCOM). All the data cited in this paragraph
are reported in Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Internet Penetration in Italy. Source AGCOM.
According to the recording industry such an incredible decrease in a market
that for a decade had been in constant expansion, is caused by the use of these
softwares. The alarm the music sector is crying out is brutal: if not vigorously
contrasted and fought, this phenomenon could drive in few years to the complete
annihilation of the industry and in order to solve this problem the publishers
appeal to the simplest solution: completely stop Internet downloading and peer
to peer use.
Such a pessimistic warning from one of the most important industries of
the modern society, needs to be carefully examined. Can ¯le sharing, an elite
phenomenon put into practice by people with a high level of education, destroy
a sector of the economy?
It is possible to note from Table 1, that since 1998, before the creation of
5Napster, the ¯rst and probably most famous ¯le sharing software, the Italian
music market was formed for the 93% by albums, while the sales of singles had
a marginal role in the market. The album market was then formed for the 70%
by cds, for the 28% by audiotapes and for the rest by the small submarket of
LP.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Singles 3554 5093 4043 3898 3143 2477 1231 875
Tapes 14157 12945 8883 5729 3096 1149 117 117
CDs 34554 35765 35228 34206 33081 32589 29654 28340
Album 48794 48766 44142 39981 36203 33771 29758 28449
Total 52348 53859 48185 43849 39346 36248 30885 29215
Table 1: Italian Music Market (Thousands of Copies). Source FIMI.
If we extract the data about the cd submarket from the general data of the
market, we note that while the overall sales pass from the historical maximum
of 54859 thousands of units sold in 1999 to 29215 thousands (a decrease of over
45%), the cd sales decrease of 20% passing from 35765 thousands of units sold,
to 28340 thousands units. The dramatic reduction does not come from the
submarket of cd, but from the one of tapes, that in 2004 disappears altogether.
It is not simply the demand of music to change, but more speci¯cally the kind of
supports the householders purchase: in 2005 the consumers do not buy anymore
an obsolete format like the audiotape, nor the singles; the 97,7% of the market
value is determined by the cds sold.
The structure of the Home Video industry is very similar to the one of
the recording industry4, even if 30% of the market is formed by the renting of
movies, which in Italy is not allowed for the audio cd market. As in the industry
of music, in this sector a digital technology (dvd format) has replaced an older
and less e±cient magnetic technology (vhs tapes) and, as a consequence, the
tape submarket began to decrease but, unlike the other sector, the overall size of
market continued to increase. Therefore in both the sectors the disappearance
of the magnetic format does not seem to be caused by the di®usion of peer to
peer software, but simply by the technological obsolescence of the good.
The impressive growth that the dvd market is having in the last years seems
to be very similar to the analogue growth of the cd market in the nineties. Is it
just a mere coincidence? Probably not
The appearance of a better format in a market like the one of the music or the
video determines a typical \replacement e®ect". Since the new format permits
a better fruition of the good, consumers tend to replace their collections with
the new format: in the nineties compact discs replaced LPs, and the recording
industries could resell their historical archives. Great hits of the past had been
repurposed, allowing the market (and the pro¯ts of the ¯rms) to increase.
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Figure 3: Italian Home Video Market(Value in Euro). Source UNIVIDEO.
Something similar is now happening in the Home Video market: consumers
are replacing their collections of old vhs, with the digital format. Nevertheless
this format gives an inconvenience to the producers. While the audio and video
tapes after some time lose their original quality, and sound or video result
compromised, every digital technology, as cd or dvd, is virtually eternal. It is
an evident case of monopolist who acts in n periods, producing at t1 a good
that is sold and produce to tn as well: the main competitor of the monopolist
is itself. When the replacement e®ect is over, the market can not grow anymore
to the previous rates. In this context it is interesting to note that in the USA5
the dvd market (rents and sales) from the 2004 to 2005 grew just of the 6%,
while in the two previous years had grown of the 42% and 38%. Moreover in the
period 2004 -2005 for the ¯rst time the video market in the USA has decreased
its size.
In Italy the video market still results to be exploding, but the Home Video
industry as well begins to be seriously worried by ¯le sharing. The growing
speed of the broad band, and the impressive expansion in the use of personal
computers, make now possible the on-line sharing not just of audio ¯les, but
of movies as well. Motion picture ¯rms are afraid to live in a very short time
the same crisis of the recording industry caused by the end of the replacement
e®ect and the erosion of the pro¯ts by pirates. Is such a warning justi¯ed? Is
really Internet killing the digital goods markets?
In the next paragraph I propose a theoretical model in order to explain the
consequences of the appearance of a pirate low quality good on the pirated ¯rm
5The data on the sales of american Home Video market are available from Motion Picture
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Figure 4: USA Home Video Market. Source MPAA.
strategy.
3 The model
3.1 Model setup: the no-copying world
In this section I propose a theoretical model of ¯le-sharing piracy. Although
the market I refer to is the music market, such model is generalizable and
able to explain the consequences of the appearance of a pirate substitute of
di®erent quality in any market where an original good produced under copyright
protection.
In this model I assume that the demand for cds comes from a continuum
of consumers, whose uniform distribution is indexed by µ, with µ 2 [0;1] and,
following most of the literature on quality of products and piracy6, the utility





Where µ is the valuation that the consumer gives to the good, in this case the
cd, and p is the price set by the monopolist. Each consumer has a completely
anaelastic demand for one unit of the good, hence each individual demands
either one unit of the good or nothing.
6For an introduction to the literature see Tirole (1988).
8Without loss of generalization the variable production cost of a digital good
can be considered zero. Furthermore I consider an installed monopolist, which
allows us to avoid incorporating the ¯xed cost of production and to concentrate
on the cases where the \annihilation" of the industry is due to the presence of
a pirate good, and not to technological constraints.
The presence of a pirate good, that is the possibility for most of the con-
sumers to download for free a copy of the cd using P2P ¯le sharing programs,
modi¯es the music market and the utility of the consumers.
Following Besen and Kirby (1989), originals and copies are imperfect sub-
stitutes and the valuation of a copy is equal to the valuation of an original,
discounted by the factor ¯.
In the case that consumers may obtain a copy of the good downloading it









where, as in the no-copying case µ is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, p
is the price set by the monopolist and w is the price of the copy, for example the
expected value of the penalty for violating copyright plus the price of Internet
connections.
Let me consider ¯rst the case where it is not possible for the ¯nal user to
copy the good, and the utility of each consumer is described by condition 1.
If p is the price set by the monopolist, the consumer i indi®erent between
buying and not buying the good is the one such that: µi = p.
It is easy to show that, given the uniform distribution of the consumers, the




1dµ = 1 ¡ p (3)
Since the objective function of the monopolist is given by ¼ = p(1 ¡ p),














where the apex NC is referred to the fact that this is the no-copying equi-
librium.
3.2 The copying world
3.2.1 The corner solutions
The no-copying assumption re°ects the technological constrains existing in the
music market until the mid 90s. Such constrains have been dramatically re-
moved by the vast di®usion of re-production technologies (such as cd recorders),
9peer-to-peer distribution software on the internet and, in the case of the record-
ing industry, mp3 music ¯les.
When it is possible to obtain a pirate copy of the good the utility of each
consumer is described by condition 2.
In such a case there are two possible corner solutions. If for any consumer
to hold is the condition:
¯µ ¡ w > µ ¡ p (5)
no matter the price that the ¯rm sets, the industry is annihilated since in
the market there are only pirates. Obviously such a scenario is the worst for
the recording companies, and the one they want to avoid7.
Moreover in the economic literature on piracy it is usually supposed that
0 · ¯ · 1. The main problem is that such an assumption can seem unrealistic
in the music market as it is today. Since the objective functionality of the mp3
music format (a ¯le designed to greatly reduce the amount of data required to
represent audio, yet still to play like a faithful reproduction of the original), for
some groups of people nowadays the valuation of a downloaded pirate ¯le can
be greater than the valuation of the original format.
The bene¯ts from mp3 have determined the increasing success and di®u-
sion of this kind of ¯le, and the creation of the market of mp3 music players.
Nowadays many consumers, in particular the under-thirty, who represent an
important target in the music market, prefer the low quality but easily trans-
portable mp3 ¯le, to the high quality sound of an old CD. In such a case the
annihilation of the market could become a concrete scenario.
The other possible corner solution is the one that is realized if for any con-
sumer the following condition holds:
µ ¡ p > ¯µ ¡ w (6)
In such a case the ¯rm acts as monopolist even if a low quality substitute
exist. Unfortunately this optimistic case does not seem to describe the actual
situation in the in the music sector, rather the scenario of the early 90s, when
mp3 had been invented, but downloading from the Internet was still hard and
expensive8. Nevertheless it can describe those markets, for example the DVDs'
7If the annihilation case described by condition 5 would be the concrete situation of the
market, no price strategy is available to the ¯rm in order to obtain revenues. Hence the record
publisher has to change its business model, for example increasing the quality of the produced
good or entering into the new low quality good market. This is exactly the strategy that
record ¯rm seems to be putting in practice in last years developing a legal market of mp3, as
main alternative to the illegal peer to peer system. It is interesting to note that in the motion
picture market some ¯rms are recently selling movies in Divx format at a very low price in
order to react to the di®usion of ¯le sharing in the movie industry. Divx is a low quality video
format.
8A growing empirical literature is trying to understand where the music market is going.
Liebowitz (2004, 2005b)is worried about the prospects of the recording industry, while Zentner
(2003) and Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004), basing their papers on cross section data-set from
the early period of ¯le-sharing (1998-2000), conclude that Internet piracy may undermine the
music business, but they do not conclude that the industry will be annihilated, rather that
10or the fashion', where a substantial di®erence in quality between the original
good and the substitute good protects the ¯rst from the \pirates".
3.2.2 The internal solution
From now on we assume that there are always buyers both of the original good
(the cd) , and the copy (the mp3 ¯le)9. In such a case two marginal consumers
exists: the consumer i indi®erent between the cd and the mp3 ¯le, and the
consumer j indi®erent between the mp3 ¯le and nothing.
For i we have:




For j we have:




Assuming the existence of some buyers of the original good, means that
1 > µi, i.e. from 7 that for the consumers of the good p < w + 1 ¡ ¯; assuming
the existence of some buyers of the copy, means that µi > µj, i.e. from 8 that
for the consumers of the copy w < ¯p.








1 ¡ ¯ ¡ p + w
1 ¡ ¯
(9)








The equilibrium of the market in the case the ¯rm maximizes its pro¯t and
there is copying is:
pC
cd =








(1 ¡ ¯ + w)2
4(1 ¡ ¯)
(11)
In absence of a substitute good (¯ = 0; w = 0), the pro¯t of the ¯rm
coincides with the one under condition 4, and for ¯ ¸ 1 we have the bankruptcy
of the ¯rm. Moreover it is possible to show10 that in the case where both the
types of consumers exist, it is always ¼C
x < ¼NC
x , i.e. the pro¯t of a recording
company in a world where there is the sharing of ¯le in Internet, given by 11, is
pro¯ts are decreasing. On the contrary the highly criticized paper by Oberholzer and Strumpf
(2004) concludes that downloads have an e®ect on sales which is statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Other empirical researches on the e®ects of ¯le sharing on the music market are
Boorstin (2004) and Blackburn (2004)
9In this context is possible to suppose that exists a group of people with di±cult access to
the new technology, or with very high learning costs.
10See Appendix.
11always smaller than the pro¯t in a no copying world, given by 4. In example if
we analyze the relevant case where w = 0, that can describe a situation where




Hence we can state the following intuitive proposition:
Proposition 1. The entrance in the market of a competitor producing an
illegal substitute good, violating the copyright, causes a decrease of the prof-
its of the ¯rm, that is directly proportional to the substitutability between the
original good and the copy (¯).
Nevertheless ¯le-sharing advocates sustain that the pro¯t or recording com-
panies might not decrease, but even increase, because ¯le-sharing would be
used just to sample between artists. According to them, after such a sampling
the consumers would purchase the favorite cds, and the market might be en-
larged. In the next paragraph I analyze such an hypothesis, proposing a model
of sampling.
4 A model of sampling
In the previous paragraph I have considered a simple monopoly pricing problem
with piracy. In this section I propose a theoretical model of sampling extending
the analysis to an intertemporal framework with two periods in order to point
out under which conditions the sample e®ect, i.e. the supposed increase in the
demand of the music market due to the possibility to test music with the mp3
¯les, do matter for the strategy and the pro¯ts of the recording industry.
In order to point out the sample e®ect I assume that a fraction ¸ of the
consumers that purchase mp3 ¯les in the ¯rst period, decides to purchase cds
in the second. In other words there is a positive externality on the original
good demand and, as a consequence of the existence of a pirate substitute, an
increase in the total number of listeners of music in the ¯rst period, increases
the number of consumers that in the second period purchase cds. Moreover I
assume that there is not a residual demand of cds, i.e. consumers that purchase
cds in the ¯rst period, purchase in the second as well.
Setting the prices, the monopolist has to consider the sample e®ect on the







where the apexes indicates the timing. Substituting the demands of the two
kinds of goods (described by conditions 9 and 10) in the objective function and
solving11 we obtain the value of the pro¯t in such an intertemporal framework.
In the previous paragraph I obtained the equilibrium pro¯ts in the no-
copying world, described by condition 4. In such a case, considering as in this
11See Appendix.
12paragraph two periods and the absence of a residual demand12, we had that the
pro¯t of the monopolist are equal to 1
2.
Hence we can compare the pro¯ts of the ¯rm in the two cases both with
and without the copying, i.e. with and without the sample e®ect, analyzing for
which values of ¸, ¯ and w the pro¯ts in a world where there is ¯le-sharing are
equal to 1
2.
In particular, considering the relevant case where w = 0, we can analyze
the e®ect of free downloading on the pro¯ts of the recording company obtaining
that the ¯rm does not lose money because of ¯le-sharing if and only if:
¸ = 2¯ (13)
Since by de¯nition it is 0 < ¸ < 1 and 0 < ¯ < 1 we can represent such a case
in the following picture:
Figure 5:
Such a line describes the combinations of ¸ and ¯ that allow to the ¯rm not
to lose pro¯ts, in a world where it is possible to download for free. The area
above the line represents the combinations of the values that allow to the ¯rm
to increase its pro¯ts, the opposite happens for the values that lies in the area
under the line.
Proposition 2. Combinations of ¸ and ¯ that allow to the ¯rm to increase
its pro¯t in case of free download do exist if and only if ¯ < 1=2, i.e. if the
substitutability between the original good and pirate good is very low.
According to my model, in the music market the ¯le-sharing does not seem
to guarantee a positive externality on the demand of cds big enough to compen-
sate the substitution e®ect due to the mp3 ¯les. Sample e®ect should increase
12That is assuming that consumers who purchase cds in the ¯rst periods purchase in the
second as well.
13the sales more than the existence of a free substitute decrease, and this seems
to be improbable.
Such a situation might realize just with binding assumptions on the value
of the parameters, or for some class of artist, for example the beginners, who
might be advantaged by an increase in the fans, more than the lose in the sale
damaged them. Moreover most of the pro¯ts of the beginners come from the
live performance, rather than cd sales, hence the positive externality should be
enlarged and the sample e®ect could plays a central role.
Nevertheless, in a world hyperconnected where anyone can be himself pro-
ducer, recording companies and more in general publisher of any digital good,
have to re-think their role and their business: in order not going bankrupt ¯rms
have to modify their strategy.
5 The ¯rm enters the low quality good market
The reaction of the recording sector to the massive piracy from end users at the
beginning of this decade was, at the best, hysterical. Many suedes were intended
against producers of ¯le-sharing software13 and even single downloaders, while
at the same time a global advertising campaign tried to make feel guilty people
used to download music ¯les from Internet. Nevertheless such a strategy did not
obtain a great success and the road to start had to be di®erent: the recording
¯rms began to sell themselves a low quality compressed music ¯le, and the
success of virtual shops like I-Tunes has been enormous.
Such a strategy is not so di®erent from the one of newspapers that decide
to make available on line a free version of the articles, obtaining revenue from
the advertising or on-line subscriptions.
Hence in the case the ¯rm decides to compete with the pirate producing










where, as usual it is assumed that µ is uniformly distributed between 0 and
1, while ® is the discounted factor of the legal low quality good and q is its price.
Since the legal substitute and the pirate good are basically the same good, but
the latter is a copy, it is valid for all the consumers that ® > ¯ in any case.
In order to avoid corner solutions, I continue assuming that buyers of all the
goods always exist, hence there are three marginal consumers: the consumer i
indi®erent between the original good and the low quality legal substitute, the
consumer j indi®erent between the low quality legal substitute and the low
13The most famous is the trial Riaa vs. Napster, that the Recording Industry Association
of America intended against the society producer of the ¯rst ¯le sharing software, Napster.
14quality pirate substitute, and the consumer s indi®erent between the latter and
nothing14. For i we have µi =
p¡q
1¡®; for j, µj =
q¡w
®¡¯; for s, µs = w
¯
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1 ¡ ®
(15)











(® ¡ ¯)p ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)q + (1 ¡ ®)w
(1 ¡ ®)(® ¡ ¯)
(16)











¯(q ¡ w) ¡ (® ¡ ¯)w
¯(® ¡ ¯)
(17)
The pro¯t of the ¯rm, that acts as a multiproduct monopolist is given by
¼(p;q) = pDx + qDL. Substituting the expressions 15 and 16 and maximizing
we obtain the following equilibrium15:
p =
1 ¡ ¯ + w
2
;q =




(® ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¯ + 2w) + w2
4(® ¡ ¯)
(18)
where the subindexes x, L indicates that the pro¯t of the ¯rm depends both
on the original good and the legal substitute.
5.1 The discussion of the model
Entering the new market is a possible strategy of the ¯rm, when it has been
pirated. Comparing the pro¯ts in the 18 and 11 give us the value of ® and ¯
that make this strategy pro¯table. Analogously comparing the pro¯ts in the 18
and 4 give us the locus of value of ® and ¯ such that the pro¯t is the same both
without low quality substitute and with both pirate and legal substitute. After
such comparisons are made we can state the following proposition16:
Proposition 3. In a copying world, that is in a world where the pirate substi-
tute exists, it is always pro¯table to the ¯rm entering the low quality market.
14Assuming the existence of some buyers of any good, means that 1 > µi > µj > µs, such
conditions are veri¯ed if p < 1 + q ¡ ®, q <
(®¡¯)p+(1¡®)w
1:¯ and w < MIN(
¯
®q;¯p).








(® ¡ ¯)p ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)q + (1 ¡ ®)w
(1 ¡ ®)(® ¡ ¯)
Di®erentiating it with respect to p and q gives is the two focs: ±¼




±q = 0 ) q =
(1¡®)w+2(®¡¯)p
2(1¡¯) that lead us to the equilibrium expressed in the 18.
16See Appendix for the proof.
15In some circumstances entering the substitute market might even increase the
pro¯t of the ¯rm, respect to the no-copying world.
The following expression:




describes the family of curves in the locus ®, ¯ that allows to the ¯rm not
to lose money respect to the case the low quality substitute does not exist.
If w = 0 the ¯rm always loses money, in fact the pro¯t in the condition 18
becomes
1¡¯
4 that is always minor than 1
4.
On the contrary if w > 0 the family of curves is represented in the following
pictures. By the constraints, the relevant area is ® < 1; ¯ < 1; ® > ¯.
Figure 6:
Every curve in the picture represents the locus of the combinations of values
of ® and ¯ that let the pro¯ts of the ¯rm unchanged respect to the no-copying
case. When w increases the curve moves above. In such a picture all the points
under one curve represents value of ® and ¯ that allow to the ¯rm to increase
its pro¯ts. Hence, while the ¯rm always loses money in the case just an illegal
substitute exist, in the case it enters the new substitute market it can increase
the pro¯t.
Moreover w may represent the decision variable choose by the political
maker. In fact in the case the pirate copy is illegal, as it is for the ¯le sharing of
pirated mp3 ¯les, it represents the expected value of the penalty for violating
copyright. As we can see from the picture, when w grows the area of increased
pro¯t for the ¯rm is bigger.
16The appearance of a substitute good in the market will be obviously opposed
by the ¯rm because, as we examined, it causes a decreasing in its pro¯ts. In fact
any time a substitute copied good appeared, the owners of the copyright started
to assert the impossibility to survive the attack of the \pirates": this happened
with the photocopiers in the 60s, the audiotapes in the 70s, the videotapes in
the 80s and the cd recorders in the 90s; it is likewise happening now with the
recording industry and the illegal sharing of mp3 ¯les.
Nevertheless, the annihilation of the industry depends on the substitutability
between the goods (¯), and the price of the low quality good (w). The latter can
depend on the enforcement, which is the expected value of the penalty. Hence
in any case when a substitute good appears, it is optimal for the ¯rm to appeal
to an increase in the enforcement of the law in order to raise the probability of
the criminal (in the ¯le sharing case the downloader) to be caught: in this way
w increases, and the ¯rm can start making monopolistic pro¯ts again.
In the historical cases mentioned above the pirated industries were not anni-
hilated by the substitute good17, even if those industries had to partially change
their model of business: for example nowadays most movies are produced (and
thought) for the home video market rather than for theaters. Nevertheless, the
substitutability between a photocopied and an original book is smaller then the
one between a cd and an mp3 ¯le (in the latter ¯ is bigger), while copying a
videotape is not as easy as downloading a ¯le from the internet (w is smaller).
Many factors can in°uence the value of ¯, and this is particular relevant in
the music market: if the consumers valuation of the pirate good increases, for
example because of the di®usion of mp3 players, or if the consumers valuation
of the original good decreases, for example because an anti piracy policy of the
¯rm decreases the quality of the cd, the valuation of the substitute good can
increase and be bigger than the valuation of the original good.
The problem for the ¯rm do exist if the quality of the substitute good is
too high, i.e.,in the terms of this model, when ¯ > 1; in such a case the ¯rm is
forced to change its business in order not be annihilated.
5.2 The e®ect of an increasing quality in the substitute
good
In the economic literature on piracy it is usually supposed that the valuation
of the substitute good is minor than the valuation of the original; in the terms
of this model it is assumed that 0 · ¯ · 1. The main problem is that, in the
age of Internet, such an assumption can seem unrealistic for many sectors and
in particular for the music market as it is today.
The bene¯ts from mp3 have determined an increasing success and di®usion
of this kind of ¯le, and the creation of the market of mp3 music players. Nowa-
days many consumers, particularly the under-thirty, who represent an important
target in the music market, prefer the low quality but easily transportable mp3
¯le, to the high quality sound of an old CD. In such a case the annihilation of
17Liebowitz (1985) shows that photocopying was even bene¯cial to the industry.
17the market could become a concrete scenario, since if a better format do exist at
a smaller price, the condition that hold is the annihilation condition described
by formula 5.
Such a condition does not hold anymore if the ¯rm enter the new low quality
substitute market. In such a case the demand for the original good disappears









Now two marginal consumers exist, µj =
q¡w
®¡¯ and µs = w
¯ , hence the demand








® ¡ ¯ ¡ q + w
® ¡ ¯
(21)
While the equilibrium in the market is the following:
pC
L =








(® ¡ ¯ + w)2
4(® ¡ ¯)
(22)
where the index C indicates the fact that we are in a copying world, while
the subindex L indicates that the equilibrium depends just on the sales of the
legal low quality good.
Since ® ¡ ¯ > 0 in such a case the pro¯t of the ¯rm are always positive.
Hence we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Anytime that a ¯rm is pirated by a di®erent quality sub-
stitute, it can enter itself the new substitute market in order not going bankrupt.
6 Artist and recording company
Until now I have considered the producer of music as a single subject, but in
the music sector there is typically a distinction between the recording company,
that produces the cd, and the artist, who writes the music.
Moreover such a distinction is re°ected in the pro¯ts of the two subjects,
hence in this paragraph I consider two sides in the music market: the legal
supports sold18, and the live performances of the artists. The growing di®usion
of peer-to-peer ¯le sharing programs (as Napster or e-mule) has shocked the ¯rst
18In the rest of the paper I refer just to the cd market, but it is possible to include in the
analysis any supports, as old fashioned vinyls, audiotapes and legal mp3, without any change
in the model.
18part of this market causing a sensible decrease in its dimension that might cause
the annihilation of the industry19. But, while the pro¯t of the ¯rm depends on
the number of cds sold, the pro¯t of the artist depends both on the number of
cds sold and the earning from live performances, the latter depending on the
total audience listening to the cd of the artist, no matter if such cd is the original
or a pirated copy. Hence for the artist there is a trade-o® between the pro¯ts
from concerts and the pro¯ts from cd sales: such a situation can potentially
generate a con°ict between the artist and the publisher.
According to the basic model presented in paragraph 3, we have that the






Where ° is the fraction of pro¯t that the ¯rm earns, while the pro¯ts that
the artist obtains from the cd are the complement 1 ¡ °, and the index m is
referred to the fact that the monopolist maximizes its own pro¯t.
The price pm
cd maximizes the pro¯t of the ¯rm, but does not the pro¯t of
the artist. In fact the latter comes both from cd and concerts. In other words
the price set by the monopolist has consequence on the audience of the artist: I
assume that the number of people going to the concert depends on the number
of people listening to the artist's music, hence for the artist might be better loss
money on the revenue from cd in order to enlarge his audience and earn from
live performances.
In order to point out the e®ect that listening to the cd has on the earnings
of the artist coming from the live performance, I assume that a fraction Á of
consumers who listen to the record (the audience of the artist), decides to go to
one concert. In this context Á plays the same role played by ¸ in the previous
paragraph, and hence is a measure of the sample e®ect.
Let me assume that the utility of each consumer to listen to a concert is
analogue to the utility to listen to a record, described in the condition 1, and





If pc is the price of a concert, the consumer indi®erent between going or
not to the concert is the consumer c such that µc = pc. Given the uniform
distribution of consumers, and being A = Dm the audience (that in this case is




1dµ = Á(1 ¡ pm) ¡ pc (25)
When the monopolist acts as shown in equilibrium 4, we have that Dc = Á1
2 ¡pc
In such a case the price set by the artist for the concert, the demand of
concert and the total pro¯ts of the artist will be:
















If the artist could set the price in order to maximize his own total pro¯ts,
the equilibrium expressed in the conditions 4 and 26 changes.
In this case the objective function of the artist, to maximize with respect to
both the price of the cd pcd and the price of the concert pc, is given by:
¼A = (1 ¡ °) ¢ pcd ¢ Dcd + pc ¢ Dc (27)
Hence the prices of the cd and the concert that maximize the pro¯t of the
artist are the following20:
pA
cd =
2(1 ¡ °) ¡ Á2
4(1 ¡ °) ¡ Á2; pA
c =
Á(1 ¡ °)
4(1 ¡ °) ¡ Á2 (28)
where the index A is referred to the fact that now it is the artist to maximize
his own pro¯t.




4(1 ¡ °) ¡ Á2; DA
c =
Á(1 ¡ °)
4(1 ¡ °) ¡ Á2 (29)
Finally the pro¯ts of the monopolist and of the artist are:
¼A
m = °
[2(1 ¡ °) ¡ Á2] ¢ [2(1 ¡ °)]
[4(1 ¡ °) ¡ Á2]2 ; ¼A
A =
(1 ¡ °)2
4(1 ¡ °) ¡ Á2 (30)
Since 0 < Á < 1 and 0 < ° < 1 by assumption, it is easy to show, comparing
















In particular the di®erence between the two possible pro¯ts of the artist
¼A
A ¡ ¼m
A, that I indicate with ¢¼N:C:






16[4(1 ¡ °) ¡ ¸2]
(31)
where the N:C: indexes that such a condition is valid in a no-copying world21.
The potential con°ict of interests between the artist and the recording com-
pany is not a new phenomenon in the market of music, but a consequence of
the structure of the earnings in such a market, and it does not exist just in the
case that there is not any e®ect of cd sales on the audience (Á = 0). The source
20Expressing the objective function of the artist described in 27 respect to the prices of the
cd and the concert gives us ¼A = (1 ¡ °) ¢ pcd ¢ (1 ¡ pcd) + pc ¢ [Á(1 ¡ pcd) ¡ pc]. Maximizing








2 , that lead to the result expressed in 28.






20of the con°ict lies in the fact that the artist is not interested just in cd sales,
but wishes his audience to be as wide as possible, and this does not depend on
¯le sharing. The ¯le sharing might alter such a situation.
6.1 The copying world case
In the paragraph 2:2:2 we saw that the presence of an illegal low quality substi-
tute modi¯es the demand of cds, and creates a demand for the new good, that
we described with conditions 9 and 10.
In this paragraph it is important to underline that in the case that a pirate
substitute exists, the audience of the artist is modi¯ed and is given by both the
buyers of the cd and the pirates who prefer the illegal substitute:










Hence, in such a case, the total demand of concert does not depend on
the price of the original cd, but by the price of the mp3 ( w
¯ ): if 0 < ¯ < 1 the
marginal consumer relevant in the de¯nition of the audience is µj, the individual
indi®erent between purchasing or not the illegal ¯le.
Proceeding as in the no-copying case, and being µc the consumer indi®erent
between going or not going to the concert such that µc = pc, it is possible to











Hence the price and the demand in the market of concert, after that the




















While the total pro¯ts of the artist will be:
¼m
A = (1 ¡ °)











If we reconsider the objective function of the artist (that as in the no-copying
case is given by ¼A = (1 ¡ °) ¢ pcd ¢ Dcd + pc ¢ Dc), in order to suppose that the
artist is to maximize it, we have:

















In order to point out the optimal prices for the artist we have to maximize
such function but, since the audience of the concert is independent from the
prices of the cd, (as shown with condition 32 and ¯gure 1), the equilibrium in
both markets results unchanged with respect to the case where the ¯rm is to
21¯x them. Hence we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 5. While a con°ict of interests does exist between the artist and
the producer in a no-copying world, such a con°ict disappears in the presence
of free download
The latter result, that depends on the assumption on the demand of concert
and the pro¯t of artist and recording company, is in contrast with the literature
(Gayer and Shy (2006)) which on the contrary underlines a growing contrast
between the two subjects.
7 Conclusion
The growing di®usion of personal computers and Internet in the world can lead
to a rise in copyright infringement for any kind of digital good. The main case
for this emerging problem is the download of audio ¯le, in the mp3 format, by
means of ¯le sharing peer-to-peer networks.
Recording companies sustain that their business is annihilated by the peer-
to-peer system, while advocates of online ¯le sharing argue that ¯le sharing
should be unrestricted: the music is an experience good and such software
allows consumers to try it out before purchasing. This chance for the consumer,
due to the presence of a low quality substitute, can increase the overall pro¯ts
of the industry.
These two statements represent the extremes of the presented model: the
structure of consumer preferences, the technological constraint of the sector and
the substitutability between the legal and the illegal good, determine where an
industry is, and what direction it is taking.
Since a high degree of substitutability exists between a cd and an mp3 ¯le,
which in addition presents low downloading costs, I show that the outlook for
the recording industry is quite worrying. Furthermore the sample e®ect does
not seem to play a central role in this industry: even in case of high level of
sampling, if there is a high substitutability between mp3s and cds (® > 1=2),
the ¯rm loses money.
In a digital world, where a good can reach the consumer without the in-
termediation of a publisher, there is little purpose for the traditional recording
industry, nevertheless I show that the annihilation condition often cried out by
the ¯rms, i.e. a scenario where the pirated sector collapse going bankrupt, is
never the equilibrium of the market, since the ¯rm can always enter itself the
substitute segment producing a good (for example selling itself mp3 ¯les), that
is of higher quality with respect to the one presents in the market.
Finally I have investigated the relation between artists and recording com-
pany, the two main subjects on the supply side of the music industry, in this
paper I shaw that the ¯le sharing can undermine their contrast.
22Further research should invest the complementarity between the digital good
sector and other markets: if, on the one hand, the piracy has decreased the
dimension of the music market, on the other hand industries that sold the
machines used by the pirates have increased their business, and for example the
market of the MP3 players has been invented from nothing. Probably the \big
enemy" of the recording industry is not the ¯nal consumers, that occasionally
can act as a pirate, but the industries that are cannibalizing music market
pro¯ts.
Appendix A
Italian Music Market (Thousands of Copies).
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Singles 3554 5093 4043 3898 3143 2477 1231 875
Tapes 14157 12945 8883 5729 3096 1149 117 117
CDs 34554 35765 35228 34206 33081 32589 29654 28340
Album 48794 48766 44142 39981 36203 33771 29758 28449
Total 52348 53859 48185 43849 39346 36248 30885 29215
Source FIMI
Internet Users in Italy (Millions)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Internet Users 3,7 9,1 13 17,9 19,9 23,7 25,6 28,6
Source AGCOM.
Broad Band in Italy (Mill. of Lines)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Broad Band 0,1 0,3 1 2,4 4,7 6,6 8,1
Note: Estimated data for year 2006
Source AGCOM.
Italian Home Video Market (Est.Value in Mil.of euro)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
VHS Rental 157 157,4 165 168 167 159 101,4 53,7 23,1
Vhs Sales 326 416 403 377 310 281,5 178,2 94,1 56
DVD Rental 0 0 0 0 13 80,1 171,8 263,5 342,6
DVD Sales 0 4,6 27 72 119 201,6 378,2 533,9 624,8
Total 483 578 595 617 609 722,2 829,6 945,2 1047,3
Source UNIVIDEO
23USA Home Video Market (Thousands of Copies)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
VHS Rental 86,2 73,6 53,2 33 14,9
Vhs Sales 539,6 407,5 240,2 115,7 33,7
DVD Rental 37,1 79,3 110,9 149,1 178,4
DVD Sales 313,9 539,9 768,2 1063,2 1114,2
Total 976,8 1100,3 1172,5 1361 1341,2
Source MPAA
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1:
I show that, in the scenario described in the paragraph 2:2:2, if exist con-
sumers both of the original good and the pirated copy, the ¯rm always lose
money.
In fact if both the consumers exist it must be that w < ¯p, i.e. w <
¯(1¡¯)
2¡¯ .
Moreover we have that ¯ < 1.
The pro¯t in the copying world is bigger than the pro¯t in the no-copying




4, such an inequality, in the space w;¯, is veri¯ed in
the area above the curve w =
p
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡
p
1 ¡ ¯) but, as we can see in the
picture, such an area is superior respect to the relevant constraint on w.
Figure 7:
Proof of Proposition 2:
24I show that the locus of values of ¸ and ¯ such that the pro¯t of the recording
company with free ¯le-sharing and the pro¯t without ¯le-sharing are equal is
given by ¸ = 2¯.
The objective function of the ¯rm in an intertemporal framework with two





mp3. The demand of cds in the
two period is Di
cd =
1¡¯¡pi+w




¯(1¡¯). Substituting such demands in the objective function
of the ¯rm we obtain:
¼ = p1
1 ¡ ¯ ¡ p1 + w
1 ¡ ¯
+ p2















¯(1 ¡ ¯ ¡ 2p2 + w) ¡ ¸(w ¡ ¯p1)
¯(1 ¡ ¯)
= 0
Solving for p1 and p2 we have the following prices:
p1 =
w¸2 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¯ + w)¸ ¡ 2¯w ¡ 2¯(1 ¡ ¯)
¯(¸2 ¡ 4)
p2 = ¡
[(¯ ¡ 2)w ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ¯)]¸ + 2¯ + 2¯(1 ¡ ¯)
¯(¸2 ¡ 4)
Substituting such prices in the objective function fo the ¯rm led us to the
following value of the pro¯t:
¼ =
¸¯(w + 1 ¡ ¯)[¯(w + 1 ¡ ¯) ¡ 2w] + 2¯2(w + 1 ¡ ¯)2 + ¸2w(1 ¡ ¯)(w ¡ ¯)
¯2[(4 ¡ ¸)2(1 ¡ ¯)]
If we impose the equality between such a pro¯t with 1
2 (that is the pro¯t the
¯rm obtains in two periods in a no-copying world), in the space [¯;¸] we have
the family of curves, function of w, for which the pro¯ts with ¯le-sharing are
the same that the pro¯ts without ¯le-sharing. In particular if we consider the
relevant case where w = 0, that describes a scenario where there is free down-







) ¸ = 2¯
Proof of Proposition 3:
I show that, in case all kinds of consumers exist, it is always pro¯table to
the pirated ¯rm enter the new low quality segment of the market, and that such
a strategy might increase the pro¯t respect to the no-copying world.
25In fact we have that ¼C
x;L ¸ ¼C
x if and only if
(® ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¯ + 2w) + w2
4(® ¡ ¯)
¸
(1 ¡ ¯ + w)2
4(1 ¡ ¯)
. That is true if and only if:















) 1 ¡ ¯ + 2w +
w2
® ¡ ¯










that is veri¯ed if ® · 1, that in the case both types of consumers exist is always
true. Just in the case w = 0, i.e. in the case of free downloading, the two pro¯ts
are equal.
Analogously comparing the pro¯ts in the 18 and 4 give us the locus of value
of ® and ¯ such that the pro¯t is the same both without low quality substitute
and with both pirate and legal substitute. From






(® ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¯ + 2w) + w2 = ® ¡ ¯ )
) (® ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¯ + 2w ¡ 1) = ¡w2
that gives us following locus:
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